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That any sane nation, having observed that you could provide for
the supply of bread by giving bakers a pecuniary interest in baking
for you, should go on to give a surgeon a pecuniary interest in
cutting off your leg, is enough to make one despair of political
humanity.
-George Bernard Shaw'
I. INTRODUCTION

In 2009 as the White House was working on health care reform,
President Obama read an article on health care costs by Atul Gawande. 2
The article compared the cost of care in two Texas communitiesMcAllen and El Paso County. 3 The communities had similar
demographics, population size, and public health statistics,' but somehow
expenditures per patient in McAllen were double the size of those in El
Paso.5 Gawande went to McAllen to ascertain why its health care costs
were so high, and he stumbled upon a simple answer: doctors in McAllen
provide too much health care. 6 For example, compared with patients in
El Paso, patients in McAllen "received two to three times as many
pacemakers, implantable defibrillators, cardiac-bypass operations,
carotid endarterectomies, and coronary-artery stents." 7 Yet, in spite of the
large quantities of care consumed in McAllen, its hospitals ranked below
El Paso's in 23 of 25 measurements of quality.8
Gawande's article represents one of the key flaws in the traditional
American health care system. Health care in the United States has
typically been offered on a "fee-for-service" basis, meaning providers are
paid for each service performed. Providers have not traditionally been
1.

GEORGE BERNARD SHAW, Preface to THE DOCTOR'S DILEMMA V (1911).

2. Robert Pear, Health CareSpending DisparitiesStir a Fight,N.Y. TIMES (June 9, 2009),
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/09/us/politics/09health.html?ref-todayspaper&_r-0.
3. Id.
4. Atul Gawande, The Cost Conundrum: What a Texas Town Can Teach Us About Health
Care, NEW YORKER (June 1, 2009), http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2009/06/01/090601fa
fact gawande?currentPage=all ("El Paso County, eight hundred miles up the border, has
essentially the same demographics. Both counties have a population of roughly seven hundred
thousand, similar public-health statistics, and similar percentages of non-English speakers, illegal
immigrants, and the unemployed.").
5. Id. ("Yet in 2006 Medicare expenditures (our best approximation of over-all spending
patterns in El Paso were $7,504 per enrollee-half as much as in McAllen.").
6. Id ("The primary cause of McAllen's extreme costs was, very simply, the across-theboard overuse of medicine.").
7. Id.
8. Id. ("Medicare ranks hospitals on twenty-five metrics of care. On all but two of these,
McAllen's five largest hospitals performed worse, on average, than El Paso's.").
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paid for quality or efficiency. Instead, they have been paid for quantity,
and they have been paid more for more complex procedures. This has
created an incentive to overprovide expensive forms of care, like the
pacemakers in McAllen, and underprovide inexpensive forms of care,
like checkups and screenings.9
The President made Gawande's article required reading in the White
House.' 0 He also discussed the piece at a meeting with two-dozen
Democratic senators, arguing that the article represented what needed to
be fixed in American health care." The President wanted to change
American health care in a way that would reward quality and not quantity.
The Affordable Care Actl 2 (ACA) is meant to shift the focus of our health
care system from quantity to quality through numerous provisions that
focus on changing the incentive structure of the system.' 3 One of those
provisions is the Medicare Shared Savings Program,1 4 which allows
Medicare providers to organize themselves as "Accountable Care
Organizations" (ACO). Under the ACO model, providers take
responsibility for defined patient populations and are paid bonuses for
meeting certain cost and quality objectives. In addition to the ACO model
for Medicare, states are also creating ACO models for Medicaid,' 5 and
providers are agreeing to ACO contracts with insurers.1 6 By the end of
9.

DAVID M. CUTLER, YOUR MONEY OR YOUR LIFE: STRONG MEDICINE FOR AMERICA'S

HEALTHCARE SYSTEM 80-81 (2004).
10. Pear, supra note 2.

11. Id.
12. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010)
[hereinafter PPACA], amended by the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010,
Pub. L. No. 11-152, 124 Stat. 1029 [hereinafter HCERA] (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C.).
13. For example, the ACA directs the Secretary of Health and Human Services to establish
a national strategy to improve the quality of health care. PPACA, supra note 12, §§ 3011-3015.
The Act also establishes a pilot program on "payment bundling," under which providers are paid
a single target price for services relating to an episode of care. Id. § 3023. Under payment
bundling, providers make more money if they can reduce their own costs while also preventing
complications. The ACA also seeks to reduce the costs associated with medical errors. For
example, Medicaid and Medicare will deny payments for medical conditions that occur due to
preventable hospital error. Id. §§ 2702, 3008. The Act also requires insurers to cover preventative
health services without cost-sharing. Public Health Service Act, § 2713, 42 U.S.C. §300gg-13,
amended by PPACA § 1001. As a final example, the ACA establishes numerous value-based
purchasing provisions in Medicare in addition to the establishment of the Medicare Shared
Savings Program. PPACA, supra note 12, §§ 3001-3008.
14. PPACA, supra note 12, § 3022 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395jjj (2012)).
15.

See, e.g., KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, EMERGING MEDICAID ACCOUNTABLE CARE

ORGANIZATIONS: THE ROLE OF MANAGED CARE (May 2012), available at http://kff.org/healthcosts/issue-brief/emerging-medicaid-accountable-care-organizations-the-role/.
16. See, e.g., SUZANNE F. DELBANCO ETAL., PROMISING PAYMENT REFORM: RISK-SHARtNG
WITH ACCOUNTABLE CARE ORGANIZATIONS (July 2011), available at http://www.commonwealth

fund.org/Publications/Fund-Reports/2011/Jul/Promising-Payment-Reform.aspx; Melanie Evans,
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2013, there were 366 Medicare ACOs, and 606 total ACOs.17
ACOs are meant to change the U.S. health care system by
fundamentally realigning the incentives of health care providers. An
industry report called ACOs "the real potential game-changer in the
Affordable Care Act," stating that ACOs have already "become a
substantial part of American health care, with the potential to catalyze
lasting, positive change as they begin to deliver the results they
promise."1 8
Yet this is not the first time that the underlying incentive structure of
fee-for-service health care has been challenged. In the 1990s, the fee-forservice model was challenged by the managed care movementparticularly by Health Maintenance Organizations (HMO). HMOs
achieved 31% of the employer-provided health insurance market by
1996.19 However, patients became dissatisfied with the HMO model,20
and the fee-for-service model ultimately won out.
ACOs share some features with managed care. In particular, managed
care is often integrated across the various providers that a patient would
need to see, from primary care physicians to specialists. ACOs are
intended to be similarly integrated. Managed care organizations are often
paid on a per-person monthly flat fee basis (this type of payment system
is known as "capitation"). Under this payment system, providers profit
when costs come in below capitated payments, and suffer losses for costs
that exceed the fixed payments. ACOs do not receive capitated payments,
but they face similar pressure to contain costs because they are subject to
bonuses or penalties depending on how they perform relative to cost
benchmarks.
While ACOs share elements with managed care, they are not a new
name for an old model. In fact, there are certain aspects of ACOs that are
revolutionary. Particularly, their bonuses depend on meeting quality
benchmarks in addition to cost benchmarks. Thus, ACOs have the
potential to provide the cost savings of managed care while also driving
Embracing ACOs: Private Insurers Forge String of Provider Deals for Accountable Care,
MODERN HEALTH CARE (Aug. 10, 2013, 12:01 AM), http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/
20130810/MAGAZINE/308109970;
ROBERT A. BERENSON & RACHEL A. BURTON,
ACCOUNTABLE CARE ORGANIZATIONS IN MEDICARE AND THE PRIVATE SECTOR: A STATUS UPDATE

3-4 (Nov. 2011), availableat http://www.urban.org/publications/412438.html.
17. David Muhlestein, Accountable Care Growth in 2014: A Look Ahead, HEALTH AFF.

BLOG (Jan. 29, 2014), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2014/01/29/accountable-care-growth-in-2014a-look-ahead/David Muhlestein.
18.

NIYuM GANDHI & RICHARD WEIL, THE ACO SURPRISE 1 (2012), available at

http://www.oliverwyman.com/media/OWENGHLSPUBLTheACO_Surprise.pdf.
19.

KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS 2013 ANNUAL SURVEY 65

Exhibit 5.1 (2013), available at http://kff.org/private-insurance/report/2013-employer-healthbenefits/.
20. CUTLER, supra note 9, at 94.
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quality improvements in the U.S. health care system.
In this Article, I analyze the underlying incentive problems with feefor-service health care, and I use those problems as a framework for
evaluating and comparing managed care and ACOs. I explain the ways
in which managed care was meant to solve the incentive problems in
American health care, and I also explain how managed care fell short. I
take a detailed look at the ACO regulations promulgated by the Centers
for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), and I explain the ways in
which ACOs are meant to fix the U.S. health care system. In many ways,
ACOs are an improvement over managed care, particularly in their focus
on quality. ACOs are not a perfect model. Their quality-based incentives
are generated by bureaucratically-created categories. ACOs will
therefore not be able to internalize the actual costs and benefits of quality,
which means that they are unlikely to provide optimal levels of quality.
Nevertheless, ACOs should increase quality in the U.S. health care
system while lowering costs. They therefore represent a vehicle for a
beneficial transformation of American health care.

II. INCENTIVE FRAMEWORK

The United States has the highest health care costs in the world, yet in
measures of quality we consistently underperform relative to other
developed countries. 2 1 So why does the United States spend so much
money without seeing much of a return on its investment? Part of the
answer can be found by looking at the incentives in our health care
system. Due to misaligned incentives, some care is overused, while other
care is underused. In this Part, I discuss overuse and underuse of health
care, and then I analyze the incentive problems with fee-for-service
health care that lead to these types of misuse.
A. Overuse and Underuse
By "overuse," I mean health care that leads to results that could have
been provided more cheaply, while still attaining health outcomes at least
as good. For example, we can again consider the residents of McAllen,
who were two or three times as likely to receive a pacemaker relative to
residents of El Paso, yet the McAllen residents did not see better health
outcomes. 22 McAllen is not the only place in the United States where care
is overused. A typical heart attack patient in the United States is many
times more likely to get bypass surgery or angioplasty in the United States
21.

KAREN DAVIS ET AL., MIRROR, MIRROR ON THE WALL: HOW THE PERFORMANCE OF THE

U.S. HEALTH CARE SYSTEM COMPARES INTERNATIONALLY 2010 UPDATE 7 (June 2010).

22.

Gawande, supra note 4.
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than in Canada. 23 Yet, heart attack survival is basically the same in both
countries. 24 In general, the United States spends about $2.5 trillion
annually on medical care, but economists calculate that nearly $1 trillion
of that total is not associated with improved outcomes. 25
By "underuse," I mean care that could be provided to achieve
improvements in health in a cost-effective manner. For example, David
Cutler, former senior health care advisor to President Obama's 2008
campaign, notes that about 20% of Medicare beneficiaries who are
discharged from a hospital are readmitted within a month for a similar
condition. 26 Some organizations prevent these readmissions by checking
in with patients after discharge and making sure that patients understand
and adhere to their recovery plans. 27 If all providers developed such
practices, billions of dollars would be saved annually and patients would
have better overall health.2 8 Cutler also discusses the extent to which
information technology (IT) has traditionally been underused in health
care. 2 9 He notes that a computerized entry system could reduce drug
prescription errors by 90%,30 systematically improving health outcomes
and reducing costs. IT improvements are also necessary for optimal
patient management, which requires sharable electronic medical records,
yet, providers in the United States have not traditionally adopted such
technologies.31
B. Incentive Problems
Overuse and underuse are caused by specific incentive problems with
fee-for-service health care. In particular, fee-for-service health care
rewards quantity and intensity and fails to align provider incentives over
time. In this section, I discuss these incentive problems.
Fee-for-service health care is basically a la carte health care.
Providers are paid per procedure, and fees are higher for more complex
procedures than they are for less complex procedures. 32 To an extent, this
makes sense from an economic standpoint. We normally pay for goods
23. Jack V. Tu et al., Use of CardiacProcedures and Outcomes in Elderly Patientswith
MyocardialInfarction in the United States and Canada, 336 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1500, 1500-05

(May 22, 1997).
24. Id.
25. DAVID CUTLER, THE QUALITY CURE: How FOCUSING ON HEALTH CARE QUALITY CAN
SAVE YoUR LIFE AND LOWER SPENDING Too 20 (2014).
26. Id at 28.

27.

Id. at 28-29.

28.

Id at 29.

29.
30.
31.

Id. at 70-95.
Id. at 76.
Id. at 81-82.

32.

CUTLER, supra note 9, at 80-81.
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and services on the basis of quantity consumed. Things that are more
difficult to produce are priced higher than things that are easy to produce.
Thus, we pay more for two loaves of bread than we do for one loaf, and
we pay more for a meal cooked by a chef than we do for an apple.
Typically, a la carte pricing is a normal market feature. It allows
consumers to make purchases based on their own preferences, the
resources they have, and the costs that they face. A consumer will allocate
her budget to a basket of goods and services such that she maximizes her
own welfare. 33 In order to maximize her own welfare, the consumer will
purchase a product up to the point where the marginal benefit of the last
unit consumed equals its marginal cost. 34 After all, if the benefit of the
next potential unit outweighs its cost, then she could consume that unit
and be better off. Conversely, if the cost of the next unit outweighs its
benefit, she would suffer a net loss by purchasing it. When these personal
welfare-maximizing decisions are aggregated across entire markets,
society maximizes its total welfare. 3 5
In health care, however, this market mechanism does not work in the
same manner because of two specific problems: asymmetric information
and the role of insurance in hiding marginal costs. Asymmetric
information occurs when one party to a transaction has more information
than another party. 36 In health care, providers are experts at evaluating
the comparative effects of various medical interventions, and patients are
not. If a doctor recommends a stent over medications for coronary artery
disease, most patients are in no position to evaluate the doctor's
recommendation. 3 7 In economic terms, patients cannot evaluate the
marginal benefit of health care interventions, so doctors are free to
provide care beyond the point at which the costs exceed the benefits.
Not only are patients in no position to evaluate the marginal benefits
of various medical interventions, they also have little incentive to care
about marginal costs. After all, most patients in the United States are
covered by insurance.3 8 Insurance therefore introduces a "moral hazard"
33.

ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMICS 67-92 (7th ed. 2009).

34. Id. at 88.
35. Id. at 309-17.
36. Id. at 617.
37. See, e.g., Medication vs. Stents for Heart Disease Treatment, HARV. HEALTH
PUBLICATIONS, http://www.health.harvard.edulfamily-health-guide/updates/medication-vs-stent

s-for-heart-disease-treatment ("For people with stable coronary artery disease (clogged arteries
nourishing the heart), artery-opening angioplasty was no better than medications and lifestyle
changes at preventing future heart attacks or strokes, nor did it extend life.") (last visited May 4,
2014).
38.

In 2012, 85.3% of the population had health insurance. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL

AND PREVENTION, 2012 HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE: EARLY RELEASE OF ESTIMATES FROM THE

NATIONAL HEALTH INTERVIEW SURVEY, 2012, at 51 (June 18, 2013), available at http://www.cdc.

gov/nchs/nhis/released201306.htm.
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problem in health care markets in which patients demand care beyond the
point at which marginal costs exceed marginal benefits. 39 Thus, if a
doctor recommends a costly treatment, patients not only lack the
expertise to challenge such a recommendation, they also lack a full
incentive to argue with the doctor. In fee-for-service health care, we
therefore have a situation in which providers can make more money by
producing health care in higher quantities and patients are in no position
to reject care that is overprovided. Thus, like the pacemakers in McAllen,
expensive procedures are overused in a fee-for-service system.4 0
Likewise, inexpensive procedures are underused. For example, David
Cutler explains that there is no money to be made in checkinf in with
patients to make sure they take the right medications. I Many
hypertensive patients do not have their blood pressure at recommended
levels, and many diabetics do not have controlled blood sugar.42 But, in
a fee-for-service system, there is no money to be made in following up
with patients in order to ensure they follow physician guidance.
Coordination is similarly underprovided in a fee-for-service system.
Physicians are paid to see patients, but they are not paid to talk to each
other-for example, about coordinating the recovery of a heart attack
victim. 4 3 IT is also underprovided for two reasons. First, providers cannot
easily attract new business through IT improvements because patients
cannot easily distinguish quality differences in providers.4 Second, if
insurers want to pay providers to improve the quality of infrastructure
like IT, they face a collective action problem. If any one insurer pays a
provider to improve infrastructure quality, patients covered by other
insurers gain the benefits associated with those improvements. 45 In other
words, other insurers can "free ride" on the investment. Worse, an insurer
cannot raise prices to cover the cost of quality improvements because
patients will move to the cheaper insurer that is free-riding on the quality
improvements.
Providers also underuse some care because their incentives are
misaligned across time. Most providers are paid by insurers, but patients
tend to regularly switch insurance companies. 46 Thus, insurers do not
have an incentive to pay for care with benefits that will reduce future
costs, like provider technology improvements and preventative care.
39.

THOMAS E. GETZEN, HEALTH ECONOMICS: FUNDAMENTALS AND FLOW OF FUNDS 68-69

(1997).
40.

CUTLER, supra note 9, at 80-81.

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Id
Id
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 60.
at 59.
at 99.
at 79-80.
at 96.
at 97.
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Furthermore, under a fee-for-service system, providers face no rewards
or consequences for their impacts on their patients' future health. For
example, they face no rewards if they prevent future amputations in their
diabetic patients, and they face no penalties if they fail to prevent such
amputations. I am not saying that providers negligently ignore patient
health-ethics and malpractice litigation prevent that. But I am saying
that because of time-misalignment, providers have less incentive to
perform some of the small beneficial actions that are discussed above,
like ensuring that patients understand and follow treatment plans.
III. MANAGED CARE

ACOs are not the first model to challenge the fee-for-service incentive
structure of U.S. health care. Managed care has been tried in the private
sector, and like ACOs, a managed care program has been implemented
through Medicare. This Part outlines the mechanics of managed care,
then discusses the managed care program under Medicare, and finishes
by explaining how managed care affects the incentive structure of the
U.S. health care system.
A. The Mechanics ofManaged Care
Managed care is a system of organizing health care providers in an
integrated way in order to reduce costs. 47 In general, managed care
organizations are networks of providers that pursue one or both of two
basic strategies. The first strategy is known as "utilization review," 48 in
which the organization monitors and works with its participating
physicians in order to ensure that care is delivered cost-effectively. 49 in
essence, an entity with an interest in keeping expenditures down-usually
the insurer-acts as a gatekeeper, vetoing procedures that are
unnecessarily costly. The second strategy, "capitation," seeks to control
costs by putting providers at risk for increased costs. Under a capitated
payment system, providers are paid a flat fee per patient instead of a fee
per service.so Thus, if providers can keep costs below their capitated
payments, they make money. If costs rise above the flat fee, providers
lose money.
There are three basic types of managed care organizations: Health
47.

NATIONAL CENTER FOR BIOTECHNOLOGY INFORMATION, MANAGED CARE PROGRAMS,

http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/mesh?term=managed%20care (last visited May 3, 2014).
48. Pam Silberman & Kerry James, Managed Care Regulations: Impact on Quality?,
QUALITY MANAGEMENT IN HEALTH CARE 21, 21, 24 (Feb. 2000).
49. See PETER R. KONGSTVELDT, ESSENTIALS OF MANAGED CARE 197-234 (4th ed. 2003).

50.

See id. at 147-53.
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Maintenance Organizations (HMO), Preferred Provider Organizations
(PPO), and point-of-service organizations (POS). 5 ' HMOs operate on the

capitation model, and the provider is also often the insurer. PPOs and
POSs are fee-for-service models that apply utilization review to keep
costs down amongst the providers in their networks. PPOs and POSs are
similar to each other, except for the fact that POSs employ more of a
gatekeeper mechanism by requiring patients to obtain referrals from
primary physicians before seeing other providers in the network.52
Because of managed care's potential to control costs, it became a very
popular model. By 2002, 96% of patients with employer-provided health
care in the United States were in managed care programs.5 3 Capitated
managed care, however, peaked in 1996 at 31% and has been falling
since.5 4 While managed care did seem to temporarily slow the increase in
health costs in the 1990s, 55 it did not improve quality.16 Consumers were

also very dissatisfied with the model.5 ' As the capitation movement fell
apart, providers returned to the fee-for-service model, driving up health
care costs in a "medical arms race." 58
B. Government Provisionof ManagedCare: Medicare PartC
The federal government has also seen managed care as a way to
reduce health care costs. Medicare has traditionally been a fee-for-service
program, governed by Medicare Parts A and B. Medicare Part A covers
inpatient hospital stays, 59 and Part B covers physician visits, outpatient
services, and preventative services. 60 Congress first introduced capitation
51.
52.

Id. at 3.
Id.

53.

KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, supra note 19.

54.

Id

55.

CUTLER, supra note 9, at 90.

56.
57.

Id. at 91.
Id. at 94.

58. Robert A. Berenson et al., Specialty-Service Lines: Salvos in the New Medical Arms
Race, HEALTH AFF. w337, w338 (2006), http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/25/5/w337.

With the decline of risk contracting and a return to fee-for-service (FFS)
payment, hospitals were relieved of the need to manage costs for defined

populations. They returned to the traditional business model of filling beds with
well-insured patients. Faced with growing competition for patients, both from
other hospitals and from ambulatory-based care, hospitals quickly adopted
strategies dedicated to increasing the flow of patients into the hospital. In short,
hospitals resumed what in the 1980s [was] described as a "medical arms race" a
form of competition tending to increase, rather than reduce, costs.
Id
59.
60.

Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C.
Id § 1395(j)-(w)(4).

§ 1395(c)-1395(i)(5) (2010).
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and managed care to Medicare in the Tax Equity and Fiscal
Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA).6 1 Under TEFRA, HMOs
contracted with Medicare to provide the full range of Medicare Part A
and Part B benefits, receiving a monthly capitated payment per enrollee.
TEFRA ensured that the program would save itself money "by paying
95% of the estimated cost of treating an average beneficiary in the
traditional fee-for-service program." Six million beneficiaries were
enrolled in the program by 1997, mostly in urban counties. 6 2
The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 (BBA) replaced TEFRA,
establishing Part C of the Medicare program, which was known at the
time as the Medicare+Choice (M+C) program. 6 3 The M+C program
weakened the link between payment rates and fee-for-service costs. It set
national payment floors for lower-cost counties and guaranteed a
minimum 2% annual increase to all plans. 64 Payment rates did not kee
pace with costs, and health plans began to withdraw from the program.
The Medicare, Medicaid, and SCHIP Benefits Improvement and
Protection Act of 2000 (BIPA) 66 attempted to stop the decline in the
program by establishing more minimum payment floors.67 However,
enrollment in private plans continued to decrease, falling to 4.7 million
by 2003.68
The Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization
Act of 2003 (MMA) transformed M+C into the "Medicare Advantage"
(MA) program. 6 9 The MMA required Part C to begin using a new
competitive bidding process in 2006.70 Under the bidding process, MA
organizations submitted bids, which were compared to local benchmark
estimates of costs per enrollee for Part A and B services. In other words,
benchmarks were set based on fee-for-service Medicare costs. If costs
were higher than the benchmark, the MA plan would be paid the
benchmark amount. If costs were lower than the benchmark, the
government would keep 25% of the savings and the plan would have to
61.

Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324 (1982).

62.

OFFICE AUDREY MCDOWELL & STEVEN SHEINGOLD, OFF. OF HEALTH POL'Y, PAYMENT

FOR MEDICARE ADVANTAGE PLANS: POLICY ISSUES AND OPTIONS 2 (2009) [hereinafter PAYMENT

FOR MA PLANS], available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/health/reports/09/medicareadvantage/report.

pdf.
63. Pub. L. No. 105-33, 111 Stat. 251 (1997). Section 4001 of the BBA added sections
1851 through 1859 to the Social Security Act. Id § 4001.
64.

PAYMENT FOR MA PLANS, supra note 62, at 2.

65.
66.
67.

Id.; 70 Fed. Reg. 4588, 4590 (Jan. 28, 2005).
Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 1(a)(6), 114 Stat. 2763, 2763A-463.
BIPA §§ 601-02.

68.

PAYMENT FOR MA PLANS, supra note 62, at 2.

69. Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003
[hereinafter MMA], Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066.
70. 70 Fed. Reg. 4588, 4589 (Jan. 28, 2005).
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pass the other 75% on to its customers in the form of additional benefits
or reduced premiums. 7 1
For every county, the benchmark was set as the greater of the average
fee-for-service costs in that county or the payment rate set for the county
in the previous year, updated for expected national average growth in
Medicare. 72 However, the pre-2006 payment rates that determined MA
payments often exceeded per capita fee-for-service Medicare costs
because Congress had set payment floors in the BBA and BIPA in order
to stimulate plan growth in rural areas.7 3 These floors caused county
benchmarks to be set well above fee-for-service costs. 74 By 2008, the MA
benchmarks were on average 18% higher than fee-for-service
expenditures.
The ACA lowered the MA benchmarks and rebates, making them
both partially dependent on certain quality metrics. The benchmark
reductions are phased in over the 2012 to 2016 time period and will range
from 95% of traditional Medicare costs in the top quartile of counties
with relatively high per capita Medicare costs to 115% of traditional
Medicare costs in the bottom quartile of counties with relatively low
Medicare costs. 76 Plans that meet a certain quality threshold will have
their benchmarks raised by up to 5%-thus, plans above the quality
threshold will in essence receive a quality bonus. Under the new rebate
system, plans will retain between 50-70% of savings under their specific
benchmark depending on the plan's quality score, with higher quality
scores generating greater rebates.
For Medicare Part C, Medicare contracts with private insurers to offer
various types of plans, including HMOs, PPOs, and even fee-forservice. 79 Most Part C beneficiaries, 64%, are enrolled in HMOs.80 PPOs
account for 31% of plans, and private fee-for-service plans account for
2% of enrollees. ' All MA plans are paid on a capitation basis.82 For PPOs
and fee-for-service arrangements, the plan gets the capitated fee and
71.
72.

Id
MMA § 211.

73.

PAYMENT FOR MA PLANS, supra note 62, at 8.

74. Id. at 9.
75. Id. at 15.
76. PPACA, supra note 12, § 3201(f)(1)(A), as amended by HCERA § 1102(b)(2),
(codified as amended 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-23(n)(2)(B) (2012)).
77. Id. § 3202(b), as amended by HCERA § I 102(c)(3) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1395w-23(o) (2012)).
78. Id § 3202(b), as amended by HCERA § 1 102(d)(2) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1395w-24(b)(1)(C)(v) (2012)).
79. 42 C.F.R. § 422.4 (2011).
80.

KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, supra note 19, at 2.

8 1.
82.

Id
42 C.F.R.

§ 422.306. (2010).
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providers are paid on a fee-for-service basis. For HMOs, the provider is
the insurer, so the provider faces the financial risk.
Medicare Part C was meant to foster private competition in Medicare
in order to produce better outcomes for better prices.83 As CMS noted in
2005, the program was meant to put participating plans "under continued
competitive pressure to improve their benefits, reduce their premiums and
cost sharing, and improve their networks and services, in order to gain or
retain enrollees." 84 To this end, Medicare Part C participants are still not
allowed to retain their rebates if they provide care more cheaply than their
fee-for-service benchmarks. Instead, they must use the rebates to improve
their competitive positions by reducing premiums to consumers or
providing additional benefits.8 5 As will be discussed infra Part V, this is
a key difference between Medicare Part C and the ACO model
implemented under the Affordable Care Act. ACOs receive monetary
bonuses for reducing costs, whereas Medicare Part C participants must
use their bonuses to compete for more enrollees. 86
C. Managed Care and the Incentive Framework
Recall that fee-for-service health care creates incentives for providers
to overuse highly intensive forms of health care like bypass surgery or
angioplasty, while underusing less-intensive interventions like
preventative care. These incentives exist in fee-for-service health care
because patients are not in a position to evaluate the marginal benefits of
potential health care interventions, and patients do not face the full
marginal costs of care.
Managed care does nothing to fix the information asymmetry between
providers and patients, nor does it do anything that fee-for-service cannot
do to change the marginal costs borne by patients. Thus, managed care
does not fix the structural aspects of the health care market that allow
providers to overuse care. However, through capitation and utilization
review, managed care does reduce some of the provider incentives to
overuse care.
Capitation, in particular, completely changes provider incentives. In a
capitated plan, providers, usually HMOs, are paid a fixed fee for a given
patient. If that patient uses no services in a given year, the provider keeps
83. 69 Fed. Reg. 46,866, at 46,918 (Aug. 3, 2004) ("The primary goal of the MMA is to
expand the health plan choices available to Medicare beneficiaries. There is also the expectation
that private plan enrollment will increase.").

84.
85.
86.

70 Fed. Reg. 4588, 4589 (Jan. 28, 2005).
Id.
69 Fed. Reg. 46,866, at 46,919 (Aug. 3, 2004) (noting that in implementing the MMA

regulations, increasing competition between plans was "expected to lead to greater efficiency

among plans and more benefits for enrollees.").
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the entire payment. If patients use more services than anticipated,
providers will face a loss. Thus, under a capitated plan, providers are at
risk for any high costs that patients may incur. Providers therefore have
an incentive to reduce costs by reducing volume and recommending less
complex procedures.
While capitation has been an effective method of cost control, it does
not necessarily lead to improved quality. 7 Capitation does not change the
fact that a given patient will likely have a different provider in the future.
Thus, capitation does not give a provider any financial stake in a patient's
future health. In other words, capitation does not align provider incentives
over time. Providers can save money by withholding care, and they will
not be liable for the future financial consequences. Capitation also does
nothing to solve the fact that patients cannot distinguish quality
differences in providers or the fact that insurers can free-ride on quality
payments made by other insurers. These aspects of quality are still
underprovided in a capitated system.
For managed care providers that engage in utilization review without
capitation, usually PPOs and POSs provider incentives are not realigned
because the underlying fee-for-service nature of the provider is
unchanged. However, the gate-keeping mechanism of utilization review
still helps keep costs down by pressuring physicians to provide less care.
Similarly to a capitated system, this may exacerbate the underuse of care
in the fee-for-service system.
IV. ACCOUNTABLE CARE ORGANIZATIONS

Section 302288 of the ACA adds Section 1899 to the Social Security
Act, requiring CMS to establish the Medicare Shared Savings Program
(MSSP), which is intended to encourage the development of Accountable
Care Organizations in Medicare. Under the program, ACO providers
continue to receive payments under the original Medicare Parts A and B
fee-for-service program. 89 However, if providers can generate savings for
Medicare while meeting certain quality benchmarks, then they receive a
portion of those savings in the form of bonus payments. 90
87.

CUTLER, supra note 9, at 90-91.

88. PPACA, supra note 12, § 3022, (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395jjj (2012)).
89. Id. § 3022(d)(1)(A).
90. The MSSP model is based on CMS's previous experience developing and
implementing a shared savings model. Pursuant to Section 412 of the Medicare, Medicaid, and
CHIP Benefits Improvement and Protection Act of 2000, CMS implemented the Physician Group
Practice (PGP) Demonstration in April of 2005. 76 Fed. Medicare Shared Savings Program:
Accountable Care Organizations, 76 Fed. Reg. 19,528, at 19,535 (Apr. 7, 2011). Like the current
ACO model implemented pursuant the Section 3022, the PGP Demonstration offered a payment
model by which providers received their normal Parts A and B fee-for-service payments as well
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Thus, ACO models are based on risk-sharing between providers and
payers coupled with quality-based incentives. The Affordable Care Act
is driving the creation of ACOs through the MSSP, but private insurers
and state Medicaid plans are also developing ACO models. 9 ' This paper
addresses Medicare ACOs because the MSSP regulations are fully
promulgated, and Medicare ACOs are therefore the most fully developed.
It is also likely that other ACOs models will mirror the Medicare model
so that ACOs can efficiently treat patients from all three populationsMedicare, Medicaid, and the privately insured-using similar
procedures.
The rest of this Part details the structure of ACOs and explains how
they achieve quality and cost benchmarks in order to receive bonuses.
The Part ends with a discussion of how ACOs may affect competition in
the health care market.
A. Structure ofACOs
The Affordable Care Act defines ACOs as "groups of providers of
services and suppliers" who work together to manage and coordinate care
for Medicare fee-for-service beneficiaries. 92 The Act envisions "group
practice arrangements, networks of individual practices of ACO
professionals, partnerships or joint venture arrangements between
hospitals and ACO professionals, hospitals employing ACO
professionals, or other combinations that [CMS] determines
appropriate." 9 3
CMS has defined ACOs operationally as collections of providers with
Medicare-enrolled tax identification numbers (TINs).9 4 Using the
individual TINs, CMS is able to identify the network of individual
practices that make up a given ACO.9 5 The ACO itself is a legal entity
identified by its own TIN, and CMS will make shared savings payments
directly to that entity. 9 6 The ACO must maintain a governing body that
can distribute bonus payments from CMS and execute any other functions
as additional payments for achieving targeted quality measures and cost savings. Id By the end
of the third year of the Demonstration, all ten of the PGPs achieved target performance on at least
twenty-eight out of thirty-two quality markers for patients with diabetes, coronary artery disease,
congestive heart failure, hypertension, and for cancer screening, and six of the ten PGPs shared
in approximately $46 million in savings. Id. at 19,536.
91.

92.
(a)( )(A)
93.
67,808.
94.
95.
96.

See supra notes 15-16.

PPACA, supra note 12, § 3022(a)(1)(A) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §1395jjj
(2012)).
Medicare Shared Savings Program: Accountable Care Organizations, 76 Fed. Reg. at
Id. at 67,811.
Id. at 67,808.
Id. at 67,816.
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of the ACO as an organization.9 7
ACOs are eligible for shared savings if they can meet cost and quality
benchmarks for an assigned population of beneficiaries in a given year.9 8
CMS considers beneficiaries to be "assigned" to an ACO if a beneficiary
has chosen to receive a plurality 99 of primary care services from
physicians associated with a specific ACO.' 00 While ACOs are held
accountable for the care of their assigned beneficiaries, each individual
beneficiary is free to see any physician that is enrolled in the Medicare
program.' 0 ' ACOs must maintain at least 5,000 assigned beneficiaries to
remain eligible for the program.1 02
While ACOs will be informed of tentatively assigned beneficiaries on
a quarterly basis, final assignment is determined after the end of each
performance year based on data from that year.' 0 3 CMS will provide data
about beneficiaries who are tentatively assigned to an ACO at the time of
prospective assignment, which will allow ACOs to access information
about beneficiaries that receive some care outside the ACO.10 4 CMS
believes that this approach will provide ACOs with adequate information
to design care processes while also providing incentives for each ACO to
provide quality care to its entire beneficiary population, not just its
assigned ACO population. 0 5 CMS intends to monitor ACOs in order to
ensure that providers do not try to avoid "at-risk" beneficiaries,1 06 which
the agency has defined in terms of utilization, risk score, and diagnosis. 0 7
97. Id. at 67,819.
98. Id. at 67,861 ("[F]or each performance year during the term of the ACO's participation
agreement, the ACO must have an assigned population of beneficiaries. Eligibility for shared
savings will be based on whether the requirements for receiving shared savings payments are met
for this assigned population.").
99. 42 C.F.R. § 425.402; Medicare Shared Savings Program: Accountable Care
Organizations, 76 Fed. Reg. at 67,870. Note that the literature often uses the word "attribution"
to mean the process of assigning beneficiaries to an ACO.
100. Medicare Shared Savings Program: Accountable Care Organizations, 76 Fed. Reg. at
67,851.
101. Id. at 67,861.
102. ACA PPACA, supra note 12, § 3022(b)(2)(D); 42 C.F.R. § 425.110; CMS has
determined that at least 5,000 beneficiaries are necessary to maintain statistical stability for
purposes of calculating per capita expenditures and assessing quality performance. Medicare

Shared Savings Program: Accountable Care Organizations, 76 Fed. Reg. at 67,807.
103. 42 C.F.R. § 425.400; Medicare Shared Savings Program: Accountable Care
Organizations, 76 Fed. Reg. at 67,867.
104. Medicare Shared Savings Program: Accountable Care Organizations, 76 Fed. Reg. at
67,844-45.
105. Id. at 67,864.
106. Id. at 67,950.
107. 42 C.F.R. § 425.20 (2012). ("At-risk beneficiary means, but is not limited to, a
beneficiary who-(I) Has a high risk score on the CMS-HCC risk adjustment model; (2) Is
considered high cost due to having two or more hospitalizations or emergency room visits each
year; (3) Is dually eligible for Medicare and Medicaid; (4) Has a high utilization pattern; (5) Has
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B. Quality PerformanceStandards
This subpart explains how ACOs are evaluated for quality, discussing
the categories of quality that are measured, how ACOs are evaluated
within those categories, and how quality performance affects ACO
bonuses.
1. Quality Performance Categories
CMS has created four "domains" of quality performance standards:
(1) Patient and caregiver experience; (2) Care coordination and patient
safety; (3) Preventative health; and (4) At-risk population. 08 The "at-risk
population" domain covers patients with diabetes, hypertension (high
blood pressure), ischemic vascular disease, heart failure, and coronary
artery disease. Within each domain, there are a number of benchmarks
for a total of thirty-three benchmarks' 09 across the four domains."l 0
However, for the diabetes-related measures, five of the six measures are
grouped into one "all-or-nothing" composite performance rate. Similarly,
the two coronary-artery disease measures are also grouped into one allor-nothing composite rate for reporting purposes. Thus, the thirty-three
measures are ultimately scored as twenty-three measures. CMS has
developed ranges of possible scores within the various measures.' 11 Table
1 lists the various quality performance categories.

one or more chronic conditions; (6) Has had a recent diagnosis that is expected to result in
increased cost; (7) Is entitled to Medicaid because of disability; or (8) Is diagnosed with a mental
health or substance abuse disorder.").
108. 42 C.F.R. § 425.502 (2015).
109.

Of the thirty-three measures, seven are collected via patient survey, three are calculated

via claims, one is calculated from Electronic Health Record (EHR) Incentive Program data, and
twenty-two are collected via the Group Practice Reporting Option (GPRO) web interface, a

mechanism through which beneficiary laboratory results and other measures requiring clinical
information can be reported to CMS. Medicare Shared Savings Program: Accountable Care
Organizations, 76 Fed. Reg. at 67,891.
110. Id.
111.

CMS.Gov,

Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Quality Measures and PerformanceStandards,

http://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Medicare-Fee-for-Service-Payment/sharedsavings

program/QualityMeasuresStandards.html..http://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Medicare-Fee-for-S
ervice-Payment/sharedsavingsprogram/QualityMeasuresStandards.html (last modified Mar. 2,

2015).
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Table 1. Quality Performance Categories
Patient/Caregiver Experience
Getting Timely Care, Appointments, and Information
How Well Your Doctors Communicate
Patients' Rating of Doctor
Access to Specialists
Health Promotion and Education
Shared Decision Making
Health Status/Functional Status
Care Coordination/Patient Safety
Risk-Standardized, All Condition Readmission
Ambulatory Sensitive Conditions Admissions: Chronic
Obstructive Pulmonary Disease
Ambulatory Sensitive Conditions Admissions: Congestive
Heart Failure
Percent of PCPs who Successfully Qualify for an EHR Incentive
Program Payment
Medication Reconciliation: Reconciliation After Discharge from an
Inpatient Facility
Screening for Fall Risk
Preventive Health
Influenza Immunization
Pneumococcal Vaccination
Adult Weight Screening and Follow-up
Tobacco Use Assessment and Tobacco Cessation Intervention
Depression Screening
Colorectal Cancer Screening
Mammography Screening
Proportion of Adults who had Blood Pressure Measured within the
preceding 2 years
At Risk Population-Diabetes
Diabetes Composite - All or Nothing Scoring
Hemoglobin Al c Control (< 8 percent)
Low Density Lipoprotein (< 100)
Blood Pressure < 140/90

Tobacco Non Use
Aspirin Use
Hemoglobin Alc Poor Control (> 9 percent)
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At Risk Population-Hypertension
Blood Pressure Control
At Risk Population-Ischemic Vascular Disease
Complete Lipid Profile and LDL Control < 100 mg/dl
Use of Aspirin or Another Antithrombotic
At Risk Population-Heart Failure
Beta-Blocker Therapy for Left Ventricular Systolic Dysfunction
At Risk Population-Coronary Artery Disease
Coronary Artery Disease Composite - All or Nothing Scoring
Drug Therapy for Lowering LDL-Cholesterol
Angiotensin-Converting Enzyme Inhibitor or Angiotensin
Receptor Blocker
Therapy for Patients with CAD and Diabetes and/or Left
Ventricular
Systolic Dysfunction
Source: Final Rule at 67,888 tbl.1.

2. Evaluating ACO Performance
In order to evaluate an ACO's performance, CMS assigns points that
can be earned, generally on a sliding scale,1 1 2 for each of the thirty-three
quality measures. CMS then collects sample performance data in each
measure across the entire Medicare fee-for-service sector." 3 CMS uses
this data to model' 14 the theoretical distribution of performance for each
measure across the entire Medicare fee-for-service sector.1 15
112. All of the quality measures are on a sliding scale except diabetes and coronary artery
disease scores, which receive the maximum available points if all the criteria are met. See
Medicare Shared Savings Program: Accountable Care Organizations, 76 Fed. Reg. at 67,896
(stating that CMS proposed "all or nothing" scoring for diabetes and coronary artery disease); Id.
at 67,891 (stating that CMS has finalized the all or nothing approach to the diabetes and coronary
artery disease scores). For nearly every quality measure, an ACO receives 1.10 points for
achieving a measure at the 30th percentile of the given measure's benchmark, and can receive a
maximum score of two points for achieving a score at the 90th percentile of the benchmark. Id. at
67,899. The only measure on a different scale is the electronic health records measure, which is
weighted double that of the other measures (i.e., its scale ranges from 2.2 points to 4 points). Id.
113. Revisions to Payment Policies Under the Physician Fee Schedule and Clinical
Laboratory Fee Schedule, 78 Fed. Reg. 74,230, 74,760 (Dec. 10, 2013) (noting that this data will
include data submitted by both ACOs and traditional fee-for-service providers).
114. Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., supra note 111.
115. Medicare Shared Savings Program: Accountable Care Organizations, 76 Fed. Reg. at
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Each ACO is scored in each category, and those scores are compared
to the modeled distribution for each category. The better that an ACO
does relative to the distribution in any quality category, the more points
the ACO earns for that category." 6 For example, if an ACO achieves a
score at the 60th percentile in the influenza immunization category, then
that ACO will gain 1.55 points for that measure. If the ACO scores at the
90th percentile, then it will receive the maximum 2 points available for
the measure. CMS has set a minimum attainment level at the 30th
percentile of each performance benchmark.' "7 In other words, an ACO
that performs better than the bottom 30% of Medicare fee-for-service
providers will receive points in that category. While this means that
below-average ACOs will receive points under the current rules, CMS
intends to gradually raise the minimum attainment level over time in
order to drive quality improvements amongst ACOs.1 8
There are two exceptions to this methodology-in other words, there
are two types of measures for which CMS does not set percentile
benchmarks against a modeled distribution. First, if fee-for-service data
is unavailable, then CMS will instead award the sliding scale points based
on the percentage of points achieved on a given measure. 1 9 For example,
one of the measures is based on a patient survey of how well doctors
communicate. 120 If an ACO scores a 50% on this survey, then the ACO
is assigned points at what would normally be the 50th percentile of a
modeled distribution.12' The second exception occurs when many
Medicare fee-for-service providers score highly on a given measure.
Specifically, if at least 40% of providers score at least 80% of the points
on a given measure, then CMS will use the same flat percentage
methodology that it uses when fee-for-service data is unavailable.' 2 2
19,594.
116. See id. at 67,899.
117. 42 C.F.R. § 425.502 (2015).
118. Medicare Shared Savings Program: Accountable Care Organizations, 76 Fed. Reg. at
67,898 ("We agree with the comment suggesting we gradually raise the minimum attainment level
in order to continue to incentivize quality improvement over time and would do so through future

rulemaking after providing sufficient advance notice with a comment period to first gain industry
input.").

119. Id. at 67,899 ("We will release corresponding national benchmarks, based on . .. a flat
percentage if claims/quality data are not available . . . .").
120.

See Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., MedicareSharedSavings ProgramQuality

Measure Benchmarks for the 2015 Reporting Years, (2015), Year, CMS.GOV,
http://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Medicare-Fee-for-Service-Payment/sharedsavingsprogram/Dow
nloads/MSSP-QM-Benchmarks-2015.pdf (last visited Aug. 31, 2015).
121. Id.
122. Revisions to Payment Policies Under the Physician Fee Schedule and Clinical
Laboratory Fee Schedule, 78 Fed. Reg. 74,760 (Dec. 10, 2013) ("We are finalizing an approach
that makes use of a combination of actual data and flat percentages; specifically, we will use all
available FFS data to calculate benchmarks, including ACO data, except where performance at
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Without this fix, relatively high scorers could be low in the distribution
and miss out on some shared savings. For example, if every provider but
one scored 95% or more of the possible points for a measure, then the one
remaining provider would be at the bottom of the distribution and would
receive no points in that category, even if that provider scored 94% of the
possible points for the measure. Every measure is scored on a scale of
zero to two points, except the electronic health record measure, which is
scored on a scale of zero to four in order to reflect the importance of
electronic health records in improving the quality of care.
3. The Quality Element of ACO Bonuses
CMS uses the points that ACOs earn in each quality performance
category to weigh the bonuses that ACOs receive under the program.
CMS divides the total points an ACO earns in each domain by the total
points available for that domain to determine an ACO's quality
percentage for that domain.' 2 3 CMS averages the quality percentages
across the domains, weighting each domain equally, in order to determine
an ACO's overall performance score, which is also a percentage value.' 2 4
For example, across the four domains, if an ACO achieves 90%, 100%,
100%, and 90% of the total points available, then the ACO would have
an overall performance score of 95%. 125
Finally, CMS applies the overall performance percentage to the
maximum percentage of savings that an ACO is entitled to in order to
arrive at a final sharing rate.1 2 6 For example, if an ACO would be entitled
to a $1 million bonus and achieves a 95% overall quality score, then the
ACO would receive $950,000.
C. ACO Shared Savings
ACOs can earn bonuses or accrue penalties by sharing in the savings
or losses that they generate for Medicare relative to certain cost
benchmarks. 12 7 In other words, if an ACO generates savings for
Medicare, some of those savings are returned to the ACO as a bonus.
Likewise, if an ACO generates fee-for-service costs to Medicare greater
the 60th percentile is equal to or greater than 80% for individual measures, regardless of whether
or not the measure is clustered. In these cases, a flat percentage will be used to set the benchmark
for the measure.").

123. Medicare Shared Savings Program: Accountable Care Organizations, 76 Fed. Reg. at
67,900.
124. 42 C.F.R. § 425.502. (2015).
125. The average of 90%, 100%, 100%, and 90% is 95%.
126. Medicare Shared Savings Program: Accountable Care Organizations, 76 Fed. Reg. at
67,900.
127. 42 C.F.R. § 425.606. (2012).
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than its benchmark, the ACO may have to reimburse Medicare for some
of those costs.
There are two basic models that an ACO can choose: a one-sided
model or a two-sided model. Under the one-sided model, an ACO can
earn up to 50% of the savings it generates for Medicare.1 28 ACOs
operating under the one-sided model are not subject to penalties for costs
that exceed their fee-for-service benchmarks.1 29 An ACO may only
choose the one-sided model for its first agreement period,13 0 which is
typically three years.' 3 1 Any ACO that signs up for a subsequent
agreement period will operate under the two-sided model.1 32 Under the
two-sided model, ACOs can earn up to 60% of its total savings.1 33 For
example, if an ACO generates $1 million in savings under the two-sided
model relative to its cost benchmark, then that ACO would be eligible to
retain a maximum of $600,000 in shared savings. The methodology for
calculating shared losses under the two-sided model mirrors that of that
for shared savings.1 34
CMS sets cost benchmarks for ACOs based on the costs of care for
the average population cared for by that particular ACO during the
preceding three years.1 35 The agency then adjusts the benchmark based
on the demographics and health status of the actual assigned
population.' 36 This process is known as "risk adjustment," and it prevents
an ACO from meeting its benchmarks by simply dropping its most
expensive patients.' 3 7 An ACO's bonus is determined by a combination
of its cost and quality performances. If an ACO under the two-sided
128. 42 C.F.R. § 425.604 (2012).
129. Id.
130. 42 C.F.R. § 425.600 (2012).
131. ACO agreement periods are for three years, although some agreements that began in
2012 entailed terms that were longer by six to nine months. Medicare Shared Savings Program:
Accountable Care Organizations, 76 Fed. Reg. at 67,807.
132. 42 C.F.R. § 425.600 (2012).
133. 42 C.F.R. § 425.606 (2012).
134. Id. Medicare Shared Savings Program: Accountable Care Organizations, 76 Fed. Reg.
135. Medicare Shared Savings Program: Accountable Care Organizations, 76 Fed. Reg. at
67,912.
136. Id. at 67,911.
137. In order to risk-adjust the ACO benchmarks, CMS uses a model that it developed and
implemented in 2004 called the hierarchical condition categories (CMS-HCC) model. RTI
INTERNATIONAL, EVALUATION OF THE CMS-HCC RISK ADJUSTMENT MODEL: FINAL REPORT 2

(Mar. 2011) [hereinafter RTI INTERNATIONAL]. The agency already uses the CMS-HCC model to
adjust capitation payments to Medicare Part C providers. Id. at 2. The model uses data from a
sample of over one million Medicare beneficiaries to estimate predicted costs on for a beneficiary
based on factors like age, sex, income status, and disease group. Id. at 5. CMS updates the model's
software each year to account for changes in diagnosis codes and expenditure data. The agency
also made significant revisions to the model in 2009 to adjust for changes in disease patterns,
treatment methods, coding practices, and changes within the Medicare population. Id. at 7.
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model generates $1 million in savings under its benchmark and achieves
a 95% overall quality score, then the ACO would receive 95% of the
maximum $600,000 that it could have received. In other words, the ACO
would receive $570,000.138
There are two other restraints on ACO bonuses. First, because there
will be some randomness in expenditures, CMS wants to ensure that
ACOs are rewarded for savings based on actual efficiency improvements
and not natural variation. This is especially true for ACOs opting for the
one-sided model. All else equal with no changes in quality or efficiency,
an ACO should have a 50% chance of seeing costs below its benchmark
and a 50% chance of seeing costs above its benchmark. For an ACO
under the one-sided model, that would represent a 50% chance of earning
revenue for nothing. For an ACO under the two-sided model, the
probability of winning for doing nothing is offset by the equal probability
of losing.
In order to solve this problem, CMS established a "minimum savings
rate" (MSR), which is a percentage threshold below the cost benchmark
that an ACO must achieve before being eligible for a bonus.1 39 For the
one-sided model, CMS established a sliding scale confidence interval
MSR that allows the agency to assign any given ACO an MSR that make
it statistically unlikely for the ACO to achieve shared savings based on
random chance alone. These MSRs would range from 3.9% for small
ACOs to 2.2% for the largest ACOs.1 40 For the two-sided model, CMS
set a flat 2% fixed MSR. 14 1
The second restraint on ACO bonuses is a limit on the amount of
shared savings that can be paid to an ACO because the agency does not
want to over incentivize cost-cutting. As the agency puts it, the range of
potential shared savings is supposed to provide ACOs an opportunity to
"receive shared savings generated from quality improvements and better
coordination and management of Part A and B services, while avoiding
creating incentives for excessive reductions in utilization which could be
harmful to beneficiaries." 42 CMS set the limit at 10% of an ACO's
benchmark under the one-sided model and 15% of an ACO's benchmark
for ACOs that elect the two-sided model. 4 3

138. $1 million * 60% * 95% = $570,000.
139. Medicare Shared Savings Program: Accountable Care Organizations, 76 Fed. Reg. at
67,927.
140. 42 C.F.R. § 425.604; (2012); Medicare Shared Savings Program: Accountable Care
Organizations, 76 Fed. Reg. at 67,928.
141. 42 C.F.R. § 425.606. (2012).
142. Medicare Shared Savings Program: Accountable Care Organizations, 76 Fed. Reg. at
67,934.
143. Id. at 67,936.
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D. Competition in the Health Care Sector
The Affordable Care Act contains numerous provisions aimed at
improving the information technology infrastructure 4 4 of the U.S. health
care system, as well as promoting population-based health care
analytics. 4 5 Many providers cannot take advantage of these ACA
provisions because they do not have the means or infrastructure to
manage information on a population basis or implement substantial
changes in technology.1 4 6 Indeed, Thomas Greaney argues that the
managed care movement partially failed because physicians practicing in
small groups or single specialty practices often did not have the
infrastructure or ability to adapt to managed care's incentive structure.1 4 7
Thus, in order to keep up with the expected changes in health care
markets under the Affordable Care Act, many providers are integrating
144.

For example, CMS must require insurers to "implement activities to improve patient

safety and reduce medical errors through the appropriate use of best clinical practices, evidence
based medicine, and health information technology under the plan or coverage ..... 42 U.S.C. §
1001(5) (2010) (adding § 2717(a)(1)(C) to the Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300gg17(a)(1)(C)). In order for insurers to be able to develop this information, providers must be able
to generate and track this information as well. The ACA also calls for a "hospital readmissions
reduction" program, PPACA § 3025, and a "payment bundling" program organizing payment
around episodes of care instead of individual services. PPACA, supra note 12, § 3023. Both
programs require technology with which to track and manage patient health.
145. For example, PPACA §§ 3001-3008 calls for "value-based purchasing" programs
other than ACOs. Value-based purchasing programs make payment contingent in some way upon

quality and therefore require that quality measures be tracked. As is true with ACOs, the general
push for value-based purchasing prioritizes information technology as a quality measure. PPACA,
supra note 12, § 3013 (adding § 931 (c)(4)(C) to the Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. § 299b3 1(c)(2)(D)). The ACA also supports "patient-centered medical homes" (PCMHs) which operate
similarly to ACOs but for patients with chronic conditions. As is true with ACOs, PCMHs are
responsible for overseeing multi-disciplinary care plans and coordinating the various providers
needed to care for patients. Id. § 3502.
146. See, e.g., SUZANNE F. DELBANCO ET AL., THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, PROMISING
PAYMENT REFORM: RISK-SHARING WITH ACCOUNTABLE CARE ORGANIZATIONS 7-8 (2011)

(analyzing private ACOs and finding that individual providers do not have the infrastructure to
manage population risks).
147.

Thomas

Greaney, Competition Policy and Organizational Fragmentation in

Healthcare, 71 U. PIT. L. REV. 217, 226 (2009).
For the large percentage of physicians practicing in small groups or single
specialty practices, adapting to managed care's incentives for risk sharing and
economizing practices was extraordinarily difficult. Many physicians proved
inept in assessing risk. In both clinical and economic decision-making such as
dealing with capitation, physicians are subject to problems of over optimism,
endowment bias, and other departures from rational choice models as identified
by behavioral decision theorists.
Id.
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with each other.1 4 8 One commentator has referred to this move towards
integration as a "merger frenzy." 49
The ACO program also creates incentives for providers to integrate.
ACOs must be of sufficient size to be to be able to coordinate care for a
population of patients from primary care through specialized services,
while also managing risks for that population. Some scholars argue that
this type of integration will improve the U.S. health care system because
the current system is too "fragmented." They contend that the system is
comprised of too many small and disconnected providers.1 50 As Greaney
argues, "There is considerable evidence that large multispecialty groups
offer clinically superior and seamless delivery of care and perform better
in terms of collecting and distributing information, thereby improving
quality."'5 1 Other scholars argue that the ACO push towards integration
may exacerbate market power problems in the health care industry.1 52
However, concerns about the market power effects of ACOs seem to
be unfounded for two reasons. First, market power is a problem because
less competition may harm consumers by increasing prices or decreasing
quality in a given market.153 But if ACOs raise prices or decrease quality,
they will lose their bonuses under the program because those bonuses are
dependent upon improving quality and reducing costs.
148. The head of a reasonably sized city hospital told the author that hospital administrators
assume hospitals will need to be of a certain threshold size in order to operate successfully under
the ACA.
149. Leemore Dafny, Hospital Industry Consolidation-Still More to Come?, 370 NEW

ENG. J. MED. 198, 198 (2013) ("The Affordable Care Act (ACA) has unleashed a merger frenzy,
with hospitals scrambling to shore up their market positions, improve operational efficiency, and
create organizations capable of managing population health.").
150.

See generallyTHE FRAGMENTATION OF U.S. HEALTH CARE (Einer R. Elhauge ed., 2010)

(evaluating the fragmented nature of U.S. health care).
151.
152.

Greaney, supra note 147, at 233.
See Thomas L. Greaney, Accountable Care Organizations-TheFork in the Road, 263

NEW ENG. J. MED. 2 (2010) ("[Tjhe ACO phenomenon may well encourage some mergers, joint
ventures, and alliances that will exacerbate [provider market concentration].") (alteration in
original); Barak Richman & Kevin Schulman, A Cautious Path Forwardon Accountable Care

Organizations, 305 JAMA 602, 602-03 (2011) (arguing that "[o]rganizers of ACOs are forging
collaborations among entire markets of physicians and hospitals, entities that would otherwise
compete with each other," and that ACOs should therefore be required to pass stringent standards

of efficiency); Dafny, supra note 149, at 3 (arguing that Medicare should incentivize ACOs "to
pursue organizational structures that do not involve joint ownership of all assets.").
153. See generally ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH
ITSELF (2d ed. 1993). Bork argued that the purpose of antitrust law is to enhance consumer
welfare. Bork's arguments have been adopted by the United States Supreme Court and now form

the basis of U.S. antitrust law. See, e.g., Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 56
(1977); Nat'l Soc'y of Prof'I Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 n.l 8 (1978); Jefferson
Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 36 (1984); Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Bd.
of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 101 (1984); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S.
574, 589 (1986).
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Second, the antitrust rules have not changed for ACOs. The
Affordable Care Act is not creating any loopholes or mechanisms that
would allow or induce ACOs to form for anticompetitive purposes. The
Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission issued a final
joint statement of antitrust enforcement policy regarding ACOs on
October 28, 2011.154 The policy statement does not apply to mergers, nor
does it apply to fully integrated entities.15 5 Thus, if providers merge or
form fully integrated HMOs, they will be evaluated pursuant to the
agencies' Horizontal Merger Guidelines,' 56 just as they would have been
before the ACA.
The policy statement applies to multi-provider joint ventures, and it
states that such arrangements are pro-competitive when they are
financially or clinically integrated' 57 and share substantial financial
risk.' 5 8 ACOs, of course, are meant to integrate and share risk. Thus,
ACOs should be considered procompetitive under the policy statement.
Yet, this is not a new policy by the antitrust agencies. In 1996, the
agencies released statements on antitrust enforcement policy in health
care. 159 In Statement 8 of that document, the agencies addressed
physician network joint ventures. Notably, the agencies stated that when
physician networks share substantial financial risk and achieve sufficient
integration, they are likely to achieve significant efficiencies.' 6 0 In other
words, even in 1996, the agencies stated that risk-sharing and integration
were a sign of procompetitive behavior.
Indeed, both the 1996 statement and the 2011 ACO statement lay out
similar rules. ACOs fall within a safety zone when ACO participants that
provide the same service in the same primary service area share 30% or
less of the market for that common service.1 6 1 For example, if two group
154. Final Policy Statement, Statement of Antitrust Enforcement Policy Regarding
Accountable Care Organizations Participating in the Medicare Shared Savings Program; Notice,
76 Fed. Reg. 67,026 (Oct. 28, 2011).
155. Id. at 67,207.
156. Id.
157. Id. ("Joint price agreements among competing health care providers are evaluated
under the rule of reason, however, if the providers are financially or clinically integrated and the

agreement is reasonably necessary to accomplish the procompetitive benefits of the integration.").
158.

Id. ("[W]here participants in physician or multiprovider joint ventures have agreed to

share substantial financial risk . . . their risk-sharing arrangement generally establishes both an
overall efficiency goal for the venture and the incentives for the participants to meet that goal.
Accordingly, the setting of price is integral to the venture's use of such an arrangement and

therefore warrants evaluation under the rule of reason.") (footnote omitted).
159.

THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, STATEMENTS OF

ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT POLICY IN HEALTHCARE (Aug. 1996) [hereinafter 1996 ANTITRUST
STATEMENT], availableat http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0000.htm.

160. Id. at 83-84.
161. Statement of Antitrust Enforcement Policy Regarding Accountable Care Organizations
Participating in the Medicare Shared Savings Program; Notice, 76 Fed. Reg. at 67,028.
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practices form an ACO and they both include cardiologists, then the ACO
will fall within the safety zone as long as it does not achieve more than
30% of the market share in its primary service area. The safety zone was
very similar as laid out in the 1996 statement. If a physician network was
non-exclusive,' 62 the network would fall within a safety zone when it
constituted 30% or less of a given local market.1 63 For an exclusive
network, the safety zone was a bit narrower at 20%.164
For multiprovider joint ventures outside of the safety zones, the
antitrust agencies still conduct similar analyses, regardless of whether the
joint ventures are ACOs. Pursuant to the 1996 statement, the agencies
apply a rule of reason analysis to joint ventures outside of the safety
zone. 165 In order to apply the 1996 analysis, the agencies define the
relevant market and compare the procompetitive versus the
anticompetitive effects of the joint venture. 166 The agencies' two key
areas of concern are whether a joint venture could raise the prices for
physician services above competitive levels, or impede the formation or
operation of other networks or plans.' 67 For ACOs, the key areas of
concern are stated more specifically,' 68 but the idea is the same. The
agencies will apply a rule of reason analysis to determine whether ACOs
outside of the safety zone create anti-competitive effects.
Because the antitrust rules for ACOs are the same now as they would
have been for similar arrangements in the absence of the Affordable Care
Act, the law cannot be creating any kind of antitrust back door. In other
words, the ACO model cannot be used as a pretense for anticompetitive
behavior because the law on anticompetitive behavior has not changed.1 69
162. See 1996 ANTITRUST STATEMENT, supra note 159, at 79 ("In an 'exclusive' venture,
the network's physician participants are restricted in their ability to, or do not in practice,

individually contract or affiliate with other network joint ventures or health plans. In a 'nonexclusive' venture, on the other hand, the physician participants in fact do, or are available to,
affiliate with other networks or contract individually with health plans.").
163. Id. at 80-81.
164. Id. at 79-80.
165. Id. at 88-91, 93.
166. Id. at 95-103.
167. Id. at 97-100.
168. See Statement of Antitrust Enforcement Policy Regarding Accountable Care
Organizations Participating in the Medicare Shared Savings Program; Notice, 76 Fed. Reg.
67,026, 67,030 (Oct. 28, 2011). See 76 Fed. Reg. (listing four items of conduct that signal
anticompetitive behavior: (1) Discouraging private payers from directing patients to choose
providers that do not participate in the ACO; (2) Tying sales of the ACO's services to the private
payer's purchase of other services from providers outside the ACO (and vice versa); (3)
Contracting on an exclusive basis with ACO providers, thereby discouraging those providers from
contracting with private payers outside the ACO; (4) Restricting a private payer's ability to make
available to its health plan enrollees cost, quality, efficiency, and performance information to aid
enrollees in evaluating and selecting providers in the health plan).
169. Id. at 67,028. The policy statement for ACOs did contain a rural exception that might
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Thus, concerns over potential anticompetitive effects of ACOs seem to
be misplaced. To the extent that ACOs alleviate fragmentation among
providers, they are likely to improve the U.S. health care market.

V. COMPARING ACOs TO MANAGED CARE

This Part describes the differences between ACOs and managed care
in terms of the incentives that providers face under each model. In
general, ACOs and managed care both create incentives for providers to
reduce costs. However, unlike managed care organizations, ACOs face
quality incentives in addition to cost reduction incentives. Quality is
likely underprovided by managed care; therefore, ACOs should improve
health care in the United States by producing a more efficient level of
quality. Yet the metrics that drive ACO quality incentives are not based
on the underlying costs and benefits of quality. Therefore, while the
quality metrics should improve the U.S. health care system, they will not
push the health care market to produce socially optimal levels of quality.
A. ACOs vs. Medicare PartC
Medicare Part C is a different type of managed care model than is
typically found in the private sector. Before discussing the differences
between ACOs and managed care generally, this Subpart discusses some
of the specific differences between the ACO model and the Medicare Part
C model.' 70

Even though ACOs and Part C participants both receive bonuses for
achieving cost savings and meeting quality benchmarks, ACOs are
presented with much stronger incentives to reduce costs. ACOs earn extra
profits by retaining a portion of the cost savings that they generate.
Medicare Part C participants, on the other hand, are not allowed to keep
cost savings-they are required to pass them along to consumers in the
form of lower costs or additional services."' In theory, Part C participants
should still have an incentive to reduce costs because they can use their
give ACOs license to expand beyond the scope of what could be achieved under the 1996
statement. The rural exception allows ACOs to qualify for a safety zone if they include one
provider per specialty for each county that contains at least one "isolated rural" or "other small
rural" zip code, even if the inclusion of these providers causes the ACO to exceed the 30%
threshold for a given area. Id. at 67,029. The same exception applies if ACOs include certain types
of rural hospitals on a non-exclusive basis. Id.
170. Note that the two programs serve distinct populations. An individual enrolled in a plan
under Medicare Part C is not eligible for assignment to an ACO. 42 C.F.R. § 425.20 (2012).
171. Medicare Program; Establishment of the Medicare Advantage Program, 70 Fed. Reg.
4588, 4589 (Jan. 28, 2005).
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passed-along savings to attract more customers, thereby outcompeting
other plans.1 72 But if this competition-based method of operation is more
profitable than simply retaining shared savings, then ACOs can also
choose to use their bonuses to pass along additional benefits to patients.
Thus, each ACO is free to choose the most profitable strategy for its
particular situation. Part C participants do not have that choice; therefore,
Part C participants will likely earn less profit from savings compared to
ACOs. Because ACOs have more opportunity to profit from generating
savings, it is likely that ACOs will generate more savings for Medicare
relative to Part C participants.
B. ACOs vs. Private Managed Care
Managed care organizations operate on the basis of utilization review
and/or capitation, both of which create incentives to reduce costs by
eliminating unnecessary care and by performing cheaper, less intensive
procedures. ACOs face similar incentives because they share in any
savings that they generate. Unlike managed care however, ACO profits
also depend upon meeting quality standards, which undo some of the
managed care incentives to underprovide care. The quality standards
therefore represent an improvement in the provider model, but they are
not perfect because the standards themselves are not based on the
underlying costs and benefits of quality. As such, they will never provide
perfectly accurate signals to markets, so they cannot drive markets toward
an optimal level of quality.
The costs of quality take the form of the time and money that providers
must spend on quality improvements, and the benefits of quality
ultimately take the form of improved health outcomes. If providers faced
all of the costs and benefits associated with quality, those costs and
benefits would push providers to offer quality at the optimal point where
it is neither underprovided nor overprovided. After all, if the benefits of
increasing quality were greater than the associated costs, providers would
increase quality to make themselves better off. Likewise, if the costs of
increased quality outweighed its benefits, providers would forego
additional quality investments in order to avoid making themselves worse
off.' 73
In health care, quality is currently underprovided. The ACA quality
standards push providers to increase quality in health care, so the
standards definitely improve health care markets. But the quality
' 172. See Medicare Program; Establishment of the Medicare Advantage Program, 69 Fed.
Reg. 46,866, 46,919 (Aug. 3, 2004).
173. This is the same concept that applies to consumers as discussed in Part 1l.B, in which
the optimal point for a particular investment or purchase is where its marginal benefits equal its
marginal costs. See PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 33.
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standards are not set on a cost and benefit basis, so there is no force
pushing the levels of quality to an optimal point within a given quality
category. For example, we know that providers should invest in IT
infrastructure, and the quality standards will push the health care industry
towards a level of IT infrastructure set by CMS, an expert agency. But
the agency cannot measure all of the nuanced aspects of the health care
and technology industries, so CMS will never be able to determine the
socially optimal level of IT infrastructure in health care.
In addition to the fact that CMS can never set a quality standard that
perfectly balances costs and benefits in any category, the agency will also
never be able to create a quality standard for every aspect of quality in
health care. There are likely countless things that providers can do to
promote quality. To the extent that those things will be underprovided if
physicians do not have an incentive to do them, there will always be
aspects of quality that are underprovided.
Quality standards will also send signals more slowly than a market
mechanism would. In general, regulations take time to change. As
Michael Graetz has said, "updating standards over time is a slow,
painstaking process that often involves much negotiation between
[industry] and regulators."l7 4 While CMS will no doubt work to keep the
quality standards in line with the latest research, there will always be a
"regulatory lag"' 7 5 between the time when a change becomes appropriate
and the time that CMS changes its rules. Thus, the quality standards will
always be at least a little bit outdated.
C. The Allure of Time-Aligned Incentives
While quality standards are likely to create significant improvements
in health care markets, they could never provide the fast, accurate, and
nuanced signals that an undistorted market mechanism would provide.
The only way to create such a market mechanism would be to align
provider incentives in such a way that pushes providers to invest in
quality in a socially optimal manner. In other words, we would want
social losses from inadequate quality to accrue directly to providers, so
providers would invest in quality up to the point where the benefits to
174. MICHAEL J. GRAETZ, THE END OF ENERGY:
ENVIRONMENT, SECURITY, AND INDEPENDENCE 199 (2011).

175.

THE UNMAKING

OF AMERICA'S

For other work on regulatory lag, see Victor B. Flatt, Should the CircleBe Unbroken?:

A Review of the Hon. Stephen Breyer's Breaking the Vicious Circle: Toward Effective Risk

Regulation, 24 ENVTL. L. 1707, 1712 (1994) (arguing that regulation takes time to catch up with
scientific analysis of risks and benefits); Michael Leachman, Regulation of the Human Tissue
Industry: A CallforFast-TrackRegulations, 65 LA. L. REV. 443, 467-68 (2004) (arguing that the
"informal rulemaking process has been too lethargic to respond to the emerging health risks posed
by human tissues, subjecting the general public to unnecessary health risks due to regulatory
lag.").
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such investments are justified by their costs. In economic terms, we want
providers to internalize the social costs and benefits of quality.
In order to create a system in which providers internalize the social
costs and benefits of quality, we would need to design a system in which
providers save money when patients experience good outcomes and lose
money when patients experience bad outcomes. In such a system,
providers would have an incentive to take actions that improve quality to
the extent that the benefits of such actions are worth the costs. Thus,
providers would invest in IT infrastructure to the extent that the resultant
health improvements were worth the costs of improvements in terms of
societal resources. Providers would also have an incentive to do many of
the little things that improve quality, such as checking in with patients to
see if they have taken their medications or taking extra time to
communicate with diabetic patients in an effort to prevent future heart
attacks and amputations.
ACOs and capitation both accomplish this goal to an extent. As Annie
Lowrey notes in a recent article, ACOs are taking action to prevent
illnesses in order to save money and qualify for bonuses. Lowrey even
provides an example of a family practice calling heart patients, asking
them not to shovel snow. 176 But ACOs and capitated managed care
organizations do not fully internalize the costs of potential adverse health
impacts because they are only responsible for patients for a short period
of time, usually a year. If an ACO or managed care organization fails to
help a diabetic patient control his blood sugar, then the organizations still
might not bear the financial costs of treating that patient's future
complications because the patient may have a different provider in the
future. In the aggregate, it is rational for a provider to discount the value
of all care that improves future outcomes because the provider will only
experience a portion of the related benefits. Thus, the incentives of ACOs
and managed care organizations are not properly aligned across time.
CMS could establish a program with properly time-aligned incentives
by creating a provider model that signs contracts with patients across a
reasonable time horizon. For example, if there were a model in which
providers were accountable for patient health for five years, then those
providers would more seriously account for the future health of those
patients. Such a model could take the form of modified ACOs, in which
some of the quality standards are still applied in order to offset health care
176.

Annie Lowrey, A Health ProviderStrives to Keep Hospital Beds Empty, N.Y. TIMES,

Apr. 23, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/24/business/accountable-care-helping-hospital
s-keep-medical-costs-down.html?_r-0 ("On a stormy evening this spring, nurses at Dr. Gary
Stuck's family practice were on the phone with patients with heart ailments, asking them not to

shovel snow. The idea was to keep them out of the hospital, and that effort-combined with
dozens more like it-is starting to make a difference: across [Chicago], doctors are providing less,
but not worse, health care.").

130

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLICPOLICY

[Vol. 26

market problems that would exist even if providers internalized the costs
and benefits of quality. For example, a time-aligned ACO model would
probably still benefit from a solution to the free rider problems that make
it difficult to invest in IT infrastructure. 7 7
In the near term, it is doubtful that CMS would experiment with a
model that locks patients into a contract with a single provider, especially
for a significant amount of time. CMS has made it clear that it intends the
ACO model to allow patients to retain the "right to see any enrolled
physician," regardless of whether a particular physician is in an ACO.1 78
This makes it unlikely that the agency would significantly limit patient
choice by locking patients into contracts with a single provider for a
substantial amount of time. However, if CMS's dedication to choice
changes in the coming years, hopefully the agency will be willing to try
a time-aligned model.
VI.

CONCLUSION

ACOs represent a revolutionary model for U.S. health care providers.
By allowing providers to share in the savings generated by cost
efficiencies, the ACO model incentivizes cost reductions, similar to the
managed care model. But in order to earn extra profits under the ACO
model, providers must also deliver high quality care. Thus, the model is
unlike managed care because it pushes providers to improve quality.
The ACO quality standards are determined by an expert agency;
therefore, the standards do not reflect the exact costs and benefits of
quality in the health care market. While this implies that levels of quality
will not be set at socially optimal levels for ACOs, the standards will
increase quality across categories of care for which quality is currently
underprovided. Thus, ACOs should improve the U.S. health care system.
The managed care movement stalled because it did not improve quality.
The ACO movement may just succeed where managed care failed.

177. Supra Part II.B.
178. Medicare Program; Medicare Shared Savings Program: Accountable Care
Organizations; Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. 67,802, 67,861; see also Medicare Program; Medicare
Shared Savings Program: Accountable Care Organizations; Final Rule 76 Fed. Reg. at 67,867
("Beneficiaries assigned to ACOs under the Shared Savings Program retain their full rights as
Medicare fee-for-service beneficiaries to seek and receive services from the physicians and other
medical practitioners of their choice. No exclusions or restrictions based on health conditions or

similar factors will be applied in the assignment of Medicare FFS beneficiaries.").

